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Summary 
 
The acceleration of developments in the European defence dimension in the late 1990’s and 
early 2000’s has inspired some to believe that the policy area is moving away from its rigidly 
intergovernmental character to a more supranational path of integration. This research 
contradicts that suggestion. The case of defence industrial lobbying for research funds shows 
a cooperative relation between the European Commission and the defence industry, which 
indicates that neo-functionalist patterns are indeed present in the defence dimension of the 
EU. However, these neo-functionalist patterns have only occurred in a policy area that has to 
be regarded as ‘low politics’. As such, this case suggests that the conventional view that the 
integration of the European defence dimension can best be explained from an 
intergovernmentalist perspective. 
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Introduction 
 
Whereas European integration in most areas of government has taken great leaps forward 
since the 1950’s, foreign policy has only cautiously been introduced within the framework of 
the European Union (EU). Security and defence policy, the area of foreign policy that deals 
with the protection against internal and external threats, has only quite recently materialized 
as an EU policy area, albeit in a predominantly intergovernmental setting. Traditionally, it 
has been one of the core responsibilities of the nation state because it touches upon the very 
essence of a state and directly involves the lives of its citizens. As such, Member States of the 
EU have not been keen on giving up their sovereignty in the realm of security and defence 
matters. It remains an issue how to match deepening multinational defence integration with 
national autonomy. 
The defence dimension of the EU remains undertheorized (Kurowska 2012: 1) and 
academic works on the subject are mostly descriptive and not very well linked to existing 
theoretical debates (Forsberg 2010: 2). Many still see intergovernmentalist theory as 
sufficiently capable of explaining the development of EU’s defence dimension, but some, as 
will be shown in the first chapter, believe that this area has evolved in a way that counteracts 
these assumptions. With the establishment of the European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP) and the development of defence capabilities, “the EU has developed into a regional 
institution with military ambitions that extend beyond Europe” (Nordheim-Martinsen 2010: 
1351). The defence industry had always been kept out of the Single Market, but since the 
inception of ESDP, the EU got increasingly involved in the armaments agenda of Europe 
(Oikonomou 2006: 2) and gave rise to an influential defence industrial lobby.  
This thesis seeks to contribute to the field of European studies, and the study of 
European integration in particular, by explaining how interest group activity indicates a 
supranationalisation of the European defence dimension. Several scholars have studied the 
European defence dimension and, based on their findings, argued that this area is moving 
away from intergovernmentalism and towards supranationalism. If the EU’s defence 
dimension is moving towards supranationalism, decision-making in that field should be 
shifting towards supranational institutions. This should be visible in the channels of influence 
that interest groups choose to lobby, as these groups will shift their focus towards 
supranational institutions. Accordingly, the primary research question of this thesis is: do the 
lobbying activities of the defence industry suggest a supranationalisation of the European 
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defence dimension? In other words, does the interest group activity of the defence industrial 
lobby fit the patterns of neo-functionalist integration theory? 
The scope of this research is confined to defence industrial policy and will focus on 
the case of the lobbying activities of the defence industry aimed at the European Commission 
(Commission) during the period following the establishment of ESDP in 1999 and leading up 
to agreement on 7
th
 Framework Programme for EU research in 2006. There are a number of 
reasons for choosing this particular case. First, defence industrial policy is a relevant area of 
the European defence dimension as it is tied to ESDP objectives. Second, the European 
Commission is a supranational institution, a driving force behind European integration, and is 
known to be a channel of influence that is very much open to interest groups and in particular 
to those of corporations. So, third, the European defence industry, which is known to have 
strong national lobbies and to be a proponent of integration, can be expected to actively lobby 
supranational institutions. Fourth, due to the opaque nature of lobbying, interest group 
activity is often not easy to measure. This case stands out as it is relatively well to assess the 
degree and success of the lobbying efforts, because the policy process and outcome have 
been accessible to monitoring by outsiders.  
This thesis consists of five chapters and takes on a comprehensive approach that 
includes the two grand theories of European integration, the basic features of Europe’s 
defence dimension, and the process of integration and development of ESDP to provide the 
reader with a sufficient background to understand the acceleration of integration in the 
European defence dimension since the 1990’s. Chapter One presents the academic debate on 
the European defence dimension by providing an overview of discussions on the nature of 
European power, ‘militarization’ of the EU, defence industrial lobbying at EU level, and the 
supranationalisation of the European defence dimension. Chapter Two introduces the 
theoretical framework by explaining neo-functionalist theory, especially focussing on the role 
of interest groups. The chapter will also feature a section on intergovernmentalist theory and 
the conventional view on EU defence. Chapter Three sets out the historical framework. It 
starts with an overview of the overall military-political history of the EU, providing the 
background for the development of defence industrial policy of the EU that is discussed in 
the second part of the chapter. Chapter Four then presents the case of the lobbying activities 
of the defence industry aimed at the European Commission during the period following the 
establishment of ESDP in 1999 and leading up to agreement on 7
th
 Framework Programme 
for EU research in 2006. Chapter Five consists of the analysis of the case, based on the 
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theoretical and historical frameworks set out in the previous chapters. Finally, the concluding 
chapter will comment on the research and its results. 
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1. Literature on the European defence dimension 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the academic debate on the defence dimension of the 
EU. The evolution of the debate shows how the developments in European defence 
integration have changed the EU and its defence dimension. The academic discussions on the 
nature of European power, militarization of the EU, the role of the defence industrial lobby in 
this process, and the potential supranationalisation of European defence are fundamental to 
understanding the progress in European defence integration that was made since the 1990’s.  
The first part of this chapter provides an overview of the debate on what kind of power the 
EU actually represents. The second part explores what the militarization of the EU means for 
the distinct character of European power. The third part discusses literature on the European 
defence industrial lobby’s efforts to influence the militarization of the EU and policies in the 
field of European security and defence. The fourth part then presents literature on how the 
nature of defence dimension of the EU is evolving.  
 
1.1 What kind of power? 
Since the beginning of the European integration project, developments – or the lack thereof – 
in the area of European security and defence have activated scholars to reflect on the EU’s 
character as an international actor. Most agree that the EU is marked by its distinct power and 
that it is a special kind of actor in world politics (Gerrits 2009: 2). 
 
1.1.1 Civilian power 
Among the first and most influential scholars to enter this discussion was François Duchêne, 
who described the EC as a non-military power and introduced the notion of ‘civilian power’ 
(1972). He argued that a united Europe
1
 could not become a military power, because due to 
its “inner diversity” it would be a “politically loose agglomeration of power”. A united 
Europe would therefore only “play a modest role in military issues” in world politics. 
However, he believed that Europe differentiated itself with its preference for economic, 
diplomatic, and cultural power rather than the use of military means. By practicing civilized 
politics instead of war and indirect violence, it could play a constructive role in shaping the 
                                                          
1
 With ‘Europe’, Duchêne actually meant Western Europe. 
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international milieu and thus be the world’s first major centre of power to be primarily 
civilian in nature. 
 The idea that traditional power was giving way to civilian power, was fiercely 
criticised by Hedley Bull (1982). Bull did not regard Europe as an actor in international 
affairs, nor did he think it would likely become one. He stressed that the notion of a non-
traditional power which Duchêne had named ‘civilian power’ had to be seen within the 
context of a specific episode of the Cold War. According to Bull, the role of force had 
seemed to be less in the foreground during the détente, but in fact, this civilian power that 
Europe, or more specifically the European Community (EC), exerted was built on the 
military power of the United States (US). This was something the EC did not control and 
such conditionality made Europe vulnerable and dependent.
2
 Bull argued that the states of 
Western Europe had to form a military alliance, preferably in association with the EC, to 
become self-sufficient in defence and security matters. Some form of political and strategic 
unity of the Western European states would be a condition sine qua non, but because this was 
very unlikely he did not see this happening any time soon. 
 
1.1.2 Normative power 
As Gerrits points out, there have been various scholars who have developed Duchêne’s ideas 
and tried to define the distinct power of the EU. None, however, has been as influential as Ian 
Manners and his notion of ‘normative power Europe’ (Gerrits 2009: 2). Two decades after 
Bull’s critique on Duchêne, Manners (2000, 2002) reacts on Bull’s views. He stresses the 
importance of norms, underlining that the Cold War had ended due to the collapse of norms 
rather than due to the power of force. Manners analyses the EU’s international role as that of 
a promoter of norms. Aiming to move beyond the discussion of civilian and military power, 
Manners characterizes the EU as a normative power which has the “ability to shape 
conceptions of ‘normal’ in international relations”. 
 According to Manners, the EU acts – and has to act – as a promoter of norms, because 
it was constructed on a normative basis. Manners emphasises that “the most important factor 
shaping the international role of the EU is not what is does or says, but what it is”. Over the 
years, the EU has developed norms and principles of peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law, 
and respect for human rights. European political and economic integration was built on these 
                                                          
2
 Duchêne had also acknowledged Europe’s military vulnerability and dependence on America. 
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principles. They are embodied in the acquis communautair et politique of the EU and are at 
the centre of its relations with its Member States and the rest of the world. 
 Whereas Manner’s concept of normative power Europe is idealistic in nature, Zaki 
Laidi has adopted a technical interpretation of the notion ‘normative power’. Like Manners, 
he sees the EU as a non-coercive power which is characterised by its preference for norms 
over force. But in his approach, Laidi does not refer to principles of peace, liberty, 
democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights. Instead, he believes that the EU’s 
power lies in the regulatory nature of Single Market. For instance, if at a certain point, 
European market rules are the tightest in the world, all the economic actors are obliged to 
tighten their standards and to comply with European regulations if they wanted to gain access 
to this very attractive market. That way, norms that protect the environment, consumers, and 
labourers are forced on the rest of the world (Laidi 2008). 
 
1.2 Militarization of the EU: No more Normative Power Europe? 
Some believe, however, that the EU has lost this unique status due to the progress that has 
been made in European the defence dimension. Karen Smith argued that the attempt to 
establish a defence policy means that the concept of normative power is no longer applicable 
to the EU. She points out that the EU started a process of discarding its civilian power image 
in the late 1990’s, when it proclaimed its ambition of a common defence policy and set goals 
for military capabilities (Smith 2000). Richard Whitman followed a similar line of thinking 
and argued that with the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 
aimed at the harmonization of a foreign policy, which intends to “include all questions related 
to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, 
which might in time lead to a common defence”, the EU and its Member States have showed  
intent to develop a defence dimension to the international identity of the EU and to move 
beyond civilian power Europe (1998: 135-136). 
 However, Whitman seemed to have changed his stance a few years later. He put 
forward that the creation of ESDP and the strengthening of the EU’s military capacity was 
not sufficient to validate or invalidate the notion of civilian power Europe. The development 
of a military security capability indeed appeared to change the conditions that are essential to 
qualify the EU as a civilian power, but the development of ESDP could be compatible with 
civilian power if the EU’s military power is seen as an instrument to safeguard other means 
of international interaction. Whitman noted that, at that time, civilian forms of power had 
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been retained and still were “the hallmark of the EU’s international identity” (Whitman 
2002). He seems to have followed a line of reasoning similar to that of Stelios Stavridis who 
had argued that a civilian power can use military means for civilian ends. In fact, he believes 
that the EU must have military means to be a civilian power as force can be necessary to 
defend and promote human rights and democratic principles. The focus should be on the ends 
of a foreign policy, not the means (Stavridis 2001). Thomas Diez shares a comparable 
opinion. He takes that normative power and military powers are not necessarily incompatible 
and that military power can be used to spread civilian values. However, the EU has to heed 
that the development of its defence dimension does not lead to a normative power in which 
military power is becoming increasingly important and eventually to the entanglement of 
normative power and military power into a situation in which the spreading of norms is used 
to legitimize military action to safeguard EU interests. “The more that Europe’s normative 
power is accompanied by military capabilities, the lesser the extent to which it will still rest 
on the power of the norm itself and the less that it will be distinguishable from traditional 
forms of power” (Diez 2005). 
 Karen Smith strongly disagrees: the EU can no longer be a civilian power, because an 
actor cannot make use of military instruments and still be a civilian power, even if it pursues 
civilian ends. Smith argues that exercising civilian power may never involve the use of the 
military, so peacekeeping forces cannot be regarded to be a civilian foreign policy 
instrument. She is very clear about the fact that since the creation of ESDP and the formation 
of formation of ‘battle groups’, “civilian power EU is definitely dead” and that the EU is not 
a special actor anymore, but one like all other international actors (Smith 2005). 
 Developments in the EU’s defence dimension have also made Manners reconsider his 
ideas of normative power Europe. Like Diez, Manners contends that militarization of the EU 
does not have to lead to a weakening of the EU’s normative power. However, he believes that 
the European Security Strategy (ESS) presents a crossroads at which the EU made “a sharp 
turn away from the normative path of sustainable peace towards a full spectrum of 
instruments for robust intervention”. After the ESS, the EU’s claim to be a normative power 
was weakened by a process of militarization characterised by a strong ambition to obtain 
military capabilities, lacking an approach aimed at preventing violent conflicts in a normative 
way by addressing the causes and not just the symptoms. Manners stresses the role of interest 
groups in the militarization of the EU. He describes how the military-armaments lobby as 
well as the technology-industrial lobby managed to create a simple but compelling 
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relationship between the need for forces capable of “robust intervention” and the 
technological and industrial benefits of defence and aerospace research (Manners 2007). 
 
1.3 Defence industrial lobbying at EU level 
Research done by Eleonora Gentilucci and Jordi Calvo Rufanges suggest that European 
defence industry lobbying is playing an important role in the emergence of European defence 
(Gentilucci 2014) and in defining defence policies (Calvo Rufanges 2015). But within the 
literature on European defence, there has not been much attention for the role of the European 
arms industry as a conceptual entity and an agent of policy that drives integration 
(Oikonomou 2006: 20; Castellacci, Fevolden and Lundmark 2014: 1222-1224). Nearly all 
texts focus on the Member States as the actors and only some mention the defence industrial 
lobby briefly. One exception is Marxist Oikonomou (2007), who wrote an extensive 
historical-materialist analysis. He finds that the emergence of EU armaments policy should 
be viewed as a response to the consolidation and internationalisation of the European arms 
industry that culminated parallel to the birth of ESDP. He believes that the role of the 
internationalised European arms industry was pivotal in the formulation of the EU armaments 
policy, allowing for the conceptualisation of the industry as a powerful ESDP policy actor. 
 The rise of an influential defence industrial lobby at EU level has also been noticed by 
activist NGOs like Statewatch and Corporate Europe Observatory, who point to the existence 
of a policy networks (Statewatch 2004)) that are “making Europe work for the arms industry” 
(Corporate Europe Observatory 2011). Frank Slijper is concerned about a “creeping 
militarisation of the European Union”. He warns for the emergence of a military-industrial 
complex
3
 (Slijper 2005: 5). This is contradicted by Mawdsley (2003: 25-26). However, she 
does point out that there is an active lobby formed by the European defence firms which have 
shifted their focus to the EU. There is a Europe wide lobby organisation for the European 
defence industry, but the big firms also lobby separately. She stresses that three biggest firms 
actively work together and that the ease of access that they have to the decision-making 
levels of the EU should not be underestimated as they are substantially setting the agenda of 
                                                          
3
 The term ‘military-industrial complex’ is meant to represent the groups within society that benefit from 
military spending and its growth. It was introduced by Dwight Eisenhower, an ex-military Republican President 
of the USA, who was concerned about the combined power of the large military establishment and the arms 
industry, which he called the military-industrial complex. This was later developed by social scientists framing 
it as coalitions of vested interests within the state and industry, which could lead to decisions being made which 
were in the interest of the coalition members and not necessarily in the interests of national security. These 
coalitions could include some members of the armed services, of the civilian defence bureaucracy, of the 
legislature, of the arms manufacturers and of their workers. (Dunne & Sköns 2010: 281). 
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defence industrial policy-making in the EU (2002, 2003). Mawdsley sees a connection with 
the findings of Ojanen, who, like Mörth and Lavallée, stresses the Commission’s proactive 
role in promoting defence industrial co-operation in Europe and cooperating with the 
armaments industry (Mawdsley 2004)Ojanen 2002, 2006; Mörth 2000, 2004; Lavallée 2011).  
Per Nordheim-Martinsen sees a rise of private actors who give advice based on their 
experience and expertise that governments or institutions often lack and thus interact in the 
policy making processes in the defence dimension of the EU (Nordheim-Martinsen 2010: 
1354). Ursula Schröder points out that this poses challenges to the accountability and the 
transparency of the political process (Schröder 2006). According to Sara Depauw, lobbying 
efforts by the defence industry have been intense and have been steering the Commission 
(Depauw 2009: 67-68). So, although there is not much detailed information available on the 
influence of the defence industry on the European defence dimension and policy making in 
that area, those sources which do mention it – including all cited above – share similar and 
relating elements which involve a high degree of lobbying activity by the defence industry 
and great access to decision-making channels, in particular the European Commission, which 
gives them considerable influence. 
 
1.4 Supranationalisation of the European defence dimension? 
Linked to the previously examined debates on nature of EU’s power and its transformation 
due to rise of a European defence, is the discussion on the character of the EU’s defence 
dimension. The defence dimension of the EU remains undertheorized. Academic works on 
the subject are mostly descriptive and not very well linked to existing theoretical debates 
(Forsberg 2010: 2; Kurowska 2012: 1). Traditionally, the integration of EU’s foreign policy, 
and defence in particular, has been explained by intergovernmentalist theory and was 
considered to be the exception to neo-functionalist rule by most (Ojanen 2006: 58-62). Due to 
the absence of any significant progress towards defence integration, there had been a 
consensus between the two grand theories of European integration, intergovernmentalism and 
neo-functionalism, that integration would not reach the area of security and defence. The 
developments of the late 1990’s and early 2000’s came as a surprise to many.  
 As Friso Bonga notes, when discussing the development of the European defence 
dimension, it is important to distinguish intergovernmental cooperation from truly 
supranational integration (Bonga 2014). Cooperation between consenting and still sovereign 
national states takes place when there is an overlap between the objectives of the different 
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Member States. Integration takes place when objectives are formulated from common 
interests and Member States enter a voluntary, gradual and fitful process of their integration 
whereby these autonomous units cede and pool their sovereignty to a supranational polity that 
is capable of taking initiatives, making decisions and implementing rules without the 
unanimous consent of all of its members. Seth Jones acknowledges the fact that there has 
been a significant increase in defence cooperation among EU Member States since the end of 
the Cold War, but he stresses that there has been no true integration of defence and that all 
major defence decisions are still made in the capitals of the Member States and European 
defence cooperation will remain intergovernmental, and will not become supranational in the 
foreseeable future (Jones 2007).  
 However, others have challenged the conventional viewpoint and believe there has 
been a move away from the rigidly intergovernmental character of the EU’s defence 
dimension to more supranational path of integration. Per Nordheim-Martinsen argues that 
since the end of the 1990’s, the EU’s security and defence policy has developed in a way that 
can’t be described by intergovernmentalist theory. It should rather be depicted as “the 
evolution from an intergovernmental bargain towards a highly institutionalized polity with a 
growing desire for autonomy”. States remain the primary actor, but contrary to the traditional 
realist explanation, smaller Member States and institutional actors in Brussels influence the 
process rather than being controlled top-down by a handful of large powers. He emphasizes 
that institutions play a key role in European security (Nordheim-Martinsen 2010).  
 A similar view is held by Helene Sjursen and Jolyon Howorth. According to Sjursen, 
this supranationalisation can be observed not only in CSDP, but in the EU’s foreign policy in 
general. CFSP has moved away from intergovernmentalism. This is especially so for CSDP 
(Sjursen 2011). According to Howorth, decision making in security and defence matters is 
now less rigidly intergovernmental. At first she put forth the notion ‘supra-national 
intergovernmentalism’ to describe decision making in ESDP, because she noted an overlap 
between intergovernmental decision making and supranational decision making (Howorth, 
2000). Later she adjusted her opinion and said that decision making in CSDP should be 
described more like ‘intergovernmental supranationalism’ because current direction is clearly 
towards ever greater cooperation and integration (Howorth 2012). Could it be that these 
authors are right by suggesting that the defence dimension of the EU is moving away from 
intergovernmentalism towards supranationalism? 
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1.5 Conclusion 
The academic debate presented in this chapter illustrates how the defence dimension of the 
EU has developed in a way that raises questions about the direction in which it is going.  
In summary, the debate on what kind of power the EU represents has long indicated that the 
EU is a unique actor in world politics. However, developments in the area of European 
security and defence have been significant and some believe that this has changed the distinct 
nature of the EU’s power and its character as international actor. The role of the defence 
industrial lobby in the process of militarization of the EU is noticed, but there is not much 
detailed information available on the influence of the defence industry on the European 
defence dimension and policy making in that area. The sources which do mention it share the 
view of a high degree of lobbying activity by the defence industry and great access to 
decision-making channels, in particular the European Commission, giving them considerable 
influence. According to Nordheim-Martinsen, Sjursen, and Howorth, developments in the 
EU’s defence dimension have led to a move away from the rigidly intergovernmental 
character to a more supranational path of integration. Next chapter will discuss the 
corresponding grand theories of supranational and intergovernmental European integration. 
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2. Theories of European Integration  
 
This chapter presents the theoretical framework of this research. Where the previous chapter 
ended with the suggestion that the European defence dimension is moving away from rigid 
intergovernmentalism towards supranationalism, this chapter presents the two grand theories 
of European integration that represent the dichotomy between these two different paths of 
development. These theories are neo-functionalism and (liberal) intergovernmentalism and as 
their starting point for explaining European integration, they take a supranationalist and an 
intergovernmentalist viewpoint, respectively. The chapter is divided into two parts, which 
will subsequently discuss the former and the latter. While doing so, there will be special 
attention to how the theories see the role of interest groups in the process of integration. The 
focus is on neo-functionalism, as this theory will provide the foundation for the final analysis. 
But, to fully understand neo-functionalist theory and European defence integration, this 
chapter takes a comprehensive approach by also discussing functionalism and 
intergovernmentalism. 
 
2.1. Neo-Functionalism 
Neo-functionalism is the oldest academic theory on EU integration. Before delving into it, 
this part will first discuss functionalism, its ‘intellectual ancestor’. Functionalism approaches 
human governance with a technocratic vision and focus on the construction of authoritative 
institutions that are created to perform a certain function in order to fulfil human needs. 
Because such institutions stem from human needs, their form should follow their function. 
Some needs are best served by international or transnational technocratic institutions
4
, which 
can operate more efficiently than national governments. National governments are often less 
effective, because government by politicians is focused on acquiring and retaining power, not 
the pursuit of the common good.  
When international institutions prove to be more efficient than national governments, 
a process of loyalty transfer away from the nation state will be the result. Also, successful 
task-oriented organizations would produce conditions for the expansion and reproduction of 
such institutions
5
 (Rosamond 2000: 31-36). These two functionalist ideas would be central 
notions in neo-functionalist theory. Functionalism’s key figure, David Mitrany, criticized 
                                                          
4
 Not political communities! 
5
 This idea can be seen as the predecessor of what neo-functionalist would later call ‘spillover’. 
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regional integration arrangements for their implicit geographical limitation, because the form 
of these regional unions follows not the functions, but territory. He argues that regionalism 
will just reproduce the flaws of the state, only on a different level. Whereas Mitrany criticized 
the EC, he did respect ECSC and Euratom for their functional logic and technocratic 
mechanism (Rosamond 2000: 36-38). 
Neo-functionalism was ispired by functionalism and introduced by Ernst B. Haas in 
an attempt to theorize the integration strategy of Jean Monnet and the other founders of 
European unity after WWII, also known as the ‘Community method’ (Rosamond 2000: 51). 
Neo-functionalism emphasizes the supranational character of European integration. It 
recognizes the importance of states, especially in the foundation of higher authorities, but 
also stresses the role of non-state actors such as institutions and interest groups. The theory 
lost most of its importance during the period of stagnation in European integration from the 
late 1960’s and early 1970’s. 
According to neo-functionalists, supranational government would have a highly 
technocratic character. Higher authorities are established by states to promote integration in 
strategic economic sectors. This will create functional pressure for integration in related 
economic sectors. As national economies gradually integrate increasingly, this deepening 
economic integration creates a need for further supranational institutionalization and so 
economic spillover leads to political integration. These key ideas of neo-functionalism are 
clearly taken from functionalism. 
There are some key differences between functionalism and neo-functionalism. One 
obvious point of departure from functionalism was the neo-functionalist emphasis on the 
inherently regional character of institutionalization. But perhaps the main difference from 
earlier functionalist approaches to international order was what the neo-functionalists saw as 
the focus on political agency in the integration process. The process that would result in 
political communities would not only be driven by the technocratic ‘automaticity’ suggested 
by Mitrany, but it would also be backed by purposeful actors in pursuit of their own self-
interest (Rosamond 2000: 55; 2005: 239-243). 
 
2.1.1 Spillover 
Central to neo-functionalism is the concept of spillover. It is the notion that integration is an 
automatic mechanism: integration will lead to more integration, because to make existing 
policies function properly, more integration is needed. Full integration of a sector would not 
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be accomplished without integration in connected sectors of the economy: the so called 
‘economic spillover’ effect. This deepening economic integration creates a need for further 
supranational institutionalization and so economic spillover leads to political integration, a 
process known as ‘political spillover’.  
 Ernst Haas first referred to spillover as  
 
“the way in which the creation and deepening of integration in one economic sector would 
create functional pressures for further economic integration within and beyond that sector, 
and this would create greater authoritative capacity at the European level. In that process, 
the expectations of social actors would shift in the direction of support for further 
integration. Key social groups within national contexts came to support deeper and more 
expansive integration. Such actors would focus on the new supranational institutions, 
because they saw these new centres of authority as a means to produce the outcomes they 
preferred” (Haas 1958: 292). 
  
Haas realized that some sectors contain more spillover potential than others. The area to 
initiate the integration progress had to be economically significant and had to be connected 
popular needs and expectations. This would be in areas of functional low politics with an 
everyday impact on the lives of citizens, and not on big issues such as defence (Haas 1961). 
Moreover, as Haas later (in 2004: xxi) noted, the key to provoking spillover dynamics, is the 
exposure of a sector (or a set of tasks) to supranational control” (Rosamond 2005: 245). This 
political activism by a higher authority to progress the economic spillover would later be 
named ‘cultivated spillover’ by Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen (1991). 
 Political spillover appears as a consequence of economic integration. Deeper and 
wider integration requires supranational regulatory capacity. To make integrated sectors 
function, a degree of harmonization of separate policies is necessary. That way, politics 
follows economy and therefore political spillover is a side effect of functional spillover. 
Political spillover requires a process of loyalty transference to be accomplished. The concept 
of loyalty was central to Haas’s original definition of political integration: 
 
“Political integration is the process whereby political actors in several distinct national 
settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities to a new 
center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing national states. 
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The end result is a new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones” (Haas 
1958: 16). 
 
Among these actors who shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities are the 
interest groups who switch their focus from national governments to supranational authority. 
 The idea of the automaticity in the process of spillover was reinforced by Leon 
Lindberg. He defined spillover as “a situation in which a given action, related to a specific 
goal creates a situation in which the original goal can be assured only by taking further 
actions, which in turn create a further condition and a need for more action, and so forth” 
(Lindberg 1963: 10). However, during the period of stagnation in European integration, 
Lindberg was the first to examine the idea that progress in integration could also avert further 
integration and introduced the concept of ‘spill-back’(Rosamond 2000: 64). Later, Phillippe 
Schmitter took the possibility of disintegrative outcomes into account and tried to redefine 
the concept of spillover and decouple the ideas of spillover and automaticity (Schmitter 1974, 
2004, 2005). 
 
2.1.2 Political agency 
During the period of stagnation in European integration during the 1960’s, emphasis moved 
away from the automaticity of functional spillover to the engagement of actors with the 
integration process. Lindberg described how successful economic integration draws in self-
interested groups of actors and how these actors created political pressures for deeper 
integration. He sees a central role for a specific kind of interest groups, business associations 
in integration. They are a strong lobby for further integration as they anticipate a certain 
economic environment. Schmitter’s approach is process-oriented and strongly emphasises the 
actors involved. As he decoupled the automaticity from the integration process, he aimed to 
demonstrate the cultivation of functional linkages by interest-driven actors, such as interest 
groups, to achieve their goals (Rosamond 2000: 62-63). 
The emphasis on actors and their interaction shows the focus of neo-functionalists on 
integration in terms of process instead of outcomes. This process is the result of the 
interaction between different actors pursuing their own interests within a pluralist political 
environment. In a pluralist polity, politics is basically the competition between the different 
groups for input into decision-making as to influence the policies that come out as the result 
and the state is subject to the demands of these contending groups. Neo-functionalism 
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assumes that the pluralist polity is relocated from the national to the supranational level 
(Rosamond 2000: 55-56). 
 The EU is thus presented with the presence and political agency of interest groups, 
who’s actions are self-regarding and goal-driven. These purposeful actors in pursuit of their 
own self-interest as drivers of the integration process because they cultivate functional 
linkages. The sum of their actions constitute behavioural patterns. It follows that the course of 
integration would be visible in the changed behaviour these groups. In particular, integrative 
processes would be clearly noticeable in strategies of interest groups seeking to influence 
policy outcomes. “Perceptions by these groups of shifts in the loci of authority and power 
would be accompanied by patterns of loyalty transference where groups ceased to direct their 
activity towards national governments and would look to the developing supranational arena” 
(Rosamond 2000: 56).  
Possibly, these groups “may change their political organization and tactics in order to 
gain access to, and to influence, such new central decision-making centres as may be 
developing” (Lindberg 1963: 9). So not only will groups change their ‘loyalties’ in a process 
called ‘loyalty transference’, they might also undergo a ‘transnationalisation’ of their 
organizational form. So the Europeanization of the polity would also manifest itself in the 
establishment of Europe-wide interest associations (Rosamond 2000: 56). These changes will 
only occur when the institutions are different from those associated with traditional 
intergovernmental organizations. Groups should have direct access to the new region-level 
institutions. They should be able to bypass the conventional gatekeeping position of national 
governments. This is a necessary requirement for the dialogue between interest groups and 
the institutions to take place and as a result to bring about integrative processes and outcomes 
(Rosamond 2000: 56). 
 
2.2 (Liberal) Intergovernmentalism 
If functionalism is neo-functionalism’s ‘intellectual ancestor’, (liberal) intergovernmentalism 
can be called its ‘intellectual nemesis’. Created as a critical reaction to neo-functionalism, its 
objective was to bring back the nation-state to the centre of the theoretical analysis of 
European integration. 
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2.2.1 Intergovernmentalism 
During the 1960’s, European integration began slowing down and the EC saw a resurgence of 
“nationalist sentiments at elite level of West European politics” (Rosamond 2000: 75). 
Charles de Gaulle and his concept of grandeur played a central role in these development, 
most notably during the infamous ‘empty chair crisis’, which was resolved with the 
Luxemburg Compromise. The agreement was an important win for intergovernmentalism 
over supranationalism. During this period, neo-functionalism began to lose its importance. 
Stanley Hoffmann (1964, 1966) produced an alternative to the neo-functionalist integration 
theory. His intergovernmentalism stresses the centrality of the nation-state and importance of 
national interests within the European integration project. 
 Central to Hoffmann’s critique of neo-functionalism was his complaint that the neo-
functionalists had not placed the integrational dynamics within the correct historical context 
(Hoffmann, 1964: 85). He believed that states were still the basic units in world politics and 
he emphasises domestic bases of interests. Due to different “domestic determinants, geo-
historical situations, and outside aims” of the units, any international system is likely to 
produce diversity and diverging interests. “Domestic differences and different world views 
obviously mean diverging foreign policies” (Hoffmann 1966: 864). At the time, the EC was 
“profoundly conservative of diversity” and this created tensions that partly explain the 
slowdown of integrative momentum (1966: 866). 
 In the beginning, these differences did not seem a problem. Hoffmann draws “on the 
distinction between ‘high’ and ‘low’ politics. Integration is possible in certain technocratic 
and uncontroversial areas of low politics, but is likely to generate conflict in matters of high 
politics where the autonomy of governments or components of national identity were at 
stake” (Rosamond 2000: 77). In matters of high politics, which are vital to the survival of the 
state, supranational integration is not possible. Hoffmann specifically mentions two defence 
issues: the European Defence Community (EDC) failure and De Gaulle’s withdrawal from 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) military integrated command and launch of 
France’s independent nuclear development programme (Hoffmann 1966: 874). 
 Hoffmann presented economics and politics as two relatively autonomous spheres. 
Functional spillover works for economic integrations, but not for politics. There can be 
economical spillover in areas of ‘low politics, but no spillover into ‘high politics’. Spillover 
mechanisms stop as matters “go beyond the purely economic problems of little impact” 
(Hoffmann 1966: 874) into areas of controversy which involved vital national interests. 
Hoffmann’s ideas “cut at the heart of the neo-functionalist paradigm” because he breaks with 
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the notion of an uninterrupted flow from economics to politics, which he believed to be the 
key element of neo-functionalist theory. (Rosamond 2000: 78). 
Intergovernmentalism reached its heydays in the 1970s, when neo-functionalists 
seemed unable to explain the stagnation in political integration and intergovernmentalism 
offered a convincing account of the developments at the time. However, as with neo-
functionalism, intergovernmentalism soon encountered events that did not math its theory. 
The Single European Act (SEA) in 1986 and the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1991 
raised questions about the intergovernmentalism’s core assumption of the divisions between 
high and low politics. The creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and the 
development of the CFSP, were clear cases where states “willingly surrendered control over 
issues of central importance to national sovereignty” (Rosamond 2000, 79). 
 
2.2.2 Liberal intergovernmentalism 
Andrew Moravcsik introduced a new approach to European integration theory (Moravcsik 
1993). He argued that European integration is not driven by supranational agents, spillover 
from earlier integration or transnational coalitions of business interest groups, but that it is the 
result of intergovernmental bargains. He regards the Member States as the most important 
actors and emphasizes that agreements reflect the relative power of each Member State.  
Moravcsik’s critique of neo-functionalism was both empirical and theoretical in 
nature. First of all, he argues that neo-functionalism has simply offered an unsatisfactory 
account of European integration because it is not able to predict or explain the uneven 
development of the EC since the 1960’s. The neo-functionalists had predicted a gradual, 
automatic, and incremental progress towards deeper integration as well as a greater 
supranational influence. Instead, the process of European integration advanced through a 
series of intergovernmental bargains. Moreover, spillover into related sectors and policies 
occurred only occasionally and supranational influence has increased slowly. In the second 
place, he stresses the absence of a clearly specified theoretical core, so it missed a proper 
basis for empirical testing and revision. Not a general theory, but more a case study of the 
early years of the EC (Moravcsik 1993: 475-477). 
  Liberal intergovernmentalism as developed by Moravcsik provides a general 
framework of analysis that is built on three core elements: the assumption that state behaviour 
is rational, a liberal theory of national preference formation, and an intergovernmentalist 
analysis of interstate negotiation. So, “governments are assumed to act purposively in the 
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international arena, but on goals that are defined domestically” and “governments first define 
a set of interests, then bargain among themselves in an effort to realize those interests”. The 
process is thus a two-level game. According to Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism, the 
development of the EC can be explained by subsequently analysing national preference 
formation and intergovernmental strategic negotiation interaction (Moravcsik 1993: 480-
482). 
The foreign policy goals of a state are to be seen as a response to pressures from 
domestic group on the national government and political institutions. This is where business 
interest groups can influence European integration. “National interests … emerge through 
domestic political conflict as societal groups compete for political influence .. and new policy 
alternatives are recognized by governments.” Rosamond points out that this is a departure 
from classis intergovernmentalism, “which sees national interest arising in the context of 
sovereign state perception of its relative position in the states system.” (Rosamond 2000: 137) 
So, in Moravcsik’s eyes there will be interest groups that compete for national preference 
formation. Then, the outcomes of these struggles will influence the positions taken by 
governments in interstate bargaining. Hoffmann on the other hand believes that interest 
groups can affect government decisions, but national governments are key in making 
decisions. In both theories, the entry point for interest groups to influence European 
integration would be on the domestic level at the national governments. 
The differences between liberal intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism are quite 
clear. Put in the words of Moravcsik himself:  
 
 “Where neo-functionalism emphasizes domestic technocratic consensus, liberal 
intergovernmentalism looks to domestic coalition struggles. Where neo-functionalism 
emphasizes opportunities to upgrade the common interest, liberal intergovernmentalism 
stresses the role of relative power. Where neo-functionalism emphasizes the active role of 
supranational officials in shaping bargaining outcomes, liberal intergovernmentalism 
stresses instead passive institutions and the autonomy of national leaders.” (1993: 518) 
 
2.3 Integration theories and European defence 
According to the intergovernmentalist theories, the Member States are still the crucial actors 
in the process of EU integration. They decide on the level of integration and define the speed 
and dimensions. States can stop or frustrate the process of integration. According to most, 
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this is still how European defence works and that is why (liberal) intergovernmentalism is the 
preferred theoretical framework to assess European defence integration. Even Haas, one of 
the founding fathers of neo-functionalist theory, thought that spillover would not reach 
security and defence and that integration for that matter would not be achieved (Haas 1961: 
366, 373; Rosamond 2000: 62; Ojanen 2006: 59-60). The reason for this is clearly that 
defence touches upon the very essence of a state and directly involves the lives of its citizens. 
As such, Member States of the EU have not been keen on giving up their sovereignty in the 
realm of security and defence matters and transferring this power to a supranational authority. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
Neo-functionalism emphasises the power of institutions and regards integration as a process 
characterised by spillover dynamics, political agency of self-interested groups, loyalty 
transfer of these groups to supranational high authorities and ‘cultivated spillover’ by these 
authorities. Neo-functionalism sees a clear role for interest groups in European integration. 
With their political agency, business interest act as purposeful actors in pursuit of their own 
self-interest. They are drivers of the integration process that create pressure for deeper 
integration. Their loyalty transference to supranational bodies leads to political spillover. 
 (Liberal) intergovernmentalism, on the other hand, is state-centric and regards 
integration as a choice by the Members States who take into account their domestic interest. 
(Liberal) intergovernmentalism makes a distinction between high and low politics. It does 
acknowledge the existence of spillover, but only in areas of low politics. The role for interest 
groups is by far not as large as in neo-functionalism. Interest groups can influence 
integration, but at the domestic level. Moravcsik sees interest groups compete for national 
preference formation. The outcomes of these struggles determine the positions taken by 
governments in interstate bargaining. Hoffmann also believes that interest groups can affect 
government decisions, but national governments are key in making decisions. 
 In summary, the two grand theories of European integration distinguish themselves by 
their supranational and intergovernmental characters, respectively. The conventional view is 
that European defence integration is the exception on the neo-functionalist rule, because 
sovereignty issues withhold Member States from supranational integration in this area. Both 
intergovernmentalists and neo-functionalist agree that European defence integration has to be 
explained by intergovernmentalist theory. 
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3. Development of European defence dimension 
 
This chapter presents the historical framework of this research. It provides an outline of the 
developments in the field of European defence, emphasising the sudden flight of European 
defence integration after a long period of taboo. The chapter is divided into two parts. The 
first part presents a broad overview of the overall military-political history of the EU, 
providing the necessary background for the development of European armaments cooperation 
defence industrial policy that is discussed in the second part. Both parts are subdivided into 
separate parts for the periods during and following the Cold War. 
 
3.1 European defence 
The first developments in the field of European defence date back to the late 1940’s. Not all 
have been successful and the failure of one in particular hard a great influence on the course 
of European defence integration. This part of the chapters provides and overview of the 
developments in European defence during and after the Cold War, showing both the periods 
of absence and emergence of European defence integration. 
 
3.1.1 European defence in the Cold War era 
The Cold War had begun almost immediately after WW2. Europe was divided into two 
camps, which were marked by profound differences in economic and political system. Stalin 
imposed Communist regimes in Eastern Europe what the US and The UK accepted as a 
Soviet sphere of influence. Western Europe accepted US protection. Strictly speaking, 
European defence integration began on 17 March 1948 when the UK, France, and the 
Benelux countries signed the Brussels Pact. The Brussels Pact established the Western Union 
(WU), a collective self-defence and economic co-operation organisation. It was built around 
The UK and originally directed against possible German aggression.  
Fundamental for the development of European defence integration was the Trumann 
Doctrine. US President Harry Trumann promised military assistance to any European country 
that came under Communist attack. The Trumann doctrine was formally implemented when 
the Washington Treaty was signed on April 4, 1949. The treaty, also known as the North 
Atlantic Treaty, established NATO. This intergovernmental organisation was a military 
alliance comprising the WU countries, Norway, Denmark, Portugal and the US and Canada. 
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An attack on one was to be considered an attack on all of them.
6
 NATO now provided a 
security umbrella for Western Europe. It also made the WU largely redundant. 
 The 1950’s began with French Foreign Minister Schuman proposal to pool 
sovereignty in the coal and steel sectors. France, West Germany, Italy and the Benelux 
countries, signed the Treaty Establishing the European Community for Coal and Steel or 
Treaty of Paris on 18 April 1951. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was a 
major step in European integration, because it was the first European organisation that was 
mainly supranational, as opposed to intergovernmental organisations like the WU or NATO. 
Although not directly focused on defence, it was very much influenced by it. Control over 
coal and steel meant control over the war industry. As such, it was a safeguard against 
German military resurgence. 
 When Communist North Korea invaded South Korea, The UK and the US wanted 
German remilitarization, because a weak Germany was a weak Europe, and a weak Europe 
was a weak Atlantic alliance against Communism. However, France was utterly opposed to 
German rearmament, so, in October 1950, French minister Pleven launched a plan for a 
supranational European army. This proposal for the establishment of the EDC. The UK had 
declined, which was a serious setback, because it was the leading military power in Europe. 
French prime minister Pleven wanted to integrate small German infantry units directly into 
the European army, without forming a German army. This, however, was “politically 
inequitable and military infeasible” (Dinan 2004: 59) and was immediately rejected by the 
Americans. A revised version of the Pleven Plan was supported by the Americans and The 
EDC treaty was signed in May 1952.  
All countries, except for France, ratified the treaty. De Gaulle had openly denounced 
the Treaty and it was defeated in a vote in parliament in August 1954. Opponents of the 
Treaty had argued that it would be dangerous for France and the empire to give up the 
sovereignty of its army. But it was probably also because France feared the rearmament of 
Germany would mean the revival of German industry, economic recovery of Germany and 
make Germany a stronger economic power than France (Dinan 2004: 29).  
After failure of the Pleven plan, supranational defence integration was no longer an 
option and would remain a taboo for many decades. British foreign secretary Anthony Eden 
proposed to turn the WU into the Western European Union (WEU) by adding West Germany 
and Italy. Within the WEU framework, West Germany could be rearmed and through the 
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WEU they could join NATO. in October 1954 Germany was remilitarized and became a 
member of NATO. 'The Six' focussed on the establishment of the Single Market. The 1957 
Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) treaty, clearly 
included provisions to exempt security and defence from the treaty due to failure of the EDC. 
European integration was to be purely economic. Defence was thus separated from the 
mainstream of European integration. While economic integration moved forward, Western 
European defence rested on NATO.  
During the following three decades, European integration in defence specifically 
remained a taboo, but foreign policy cooperation in general developed slowly. The so-called 
European Political Cooperation (EPC) developed from regular meetings of the foreign 
ministers of the Members States to a treaty based
7
 foreign policy coordination. However, 
EPC focussed on foreign policy, not on defence matters. However, EPC remained 
intergovernmental was not to hinder the defence cooperation within the NATO or WEU 
frameworks. Discussion of defence and security matters was very limited and restricted. 
Nevertheless, EPC had linked defence, as a part of foreign policy, to the European 
Communities. 
 
3.1.2 European defence in the post-Cold War era 
With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, the issue of whether the EU 
should acquire a defence responsibility reappeared. It was a central aspect of the Maastricht 
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) in 1991 (Forster 1997: 297). The primary goal of the 
1992 Treaty of Maastricht that resulted from that IGC was creating the EMU, but it also 
established CFSP. Although it was an ambitious name, it provided limited instruments. CFSP 
was more of a continuation of the EPC that had gradually developed over three decades. 
Importantly, it was intergovernmental and much less radical than the supranational EMU 
(Trybus 2005: 51-52). 
CFSP was one of the most difficult issues during the IGC on the TEU. Member States 
lacked the impetus to share sovereignty in the area of foreign and security policy. A real 
common foreign policy, let alone a common security policy was out of the question. The 
most that could be achieved was a high degree of coordination (Dinan 2004: 253). Because it 
was such a sensitive subject, the section on CFSP was fairly restrained. Nonetheless, for the 
first time in the history of the EU, security and defence was explicitly mentioned as part of 
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foreign policy. A certain degree of defence integration was possible thanks to the changes in 
the political landscape due to the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. 
The establishment of CFSP did not render the WEU and NATO obsolete. The 
Maastricht Treaty had recognised the WEU as an integral part of the development of the EU, 
which could ask the WEU to “elaborate and implement the EU’s decisions and actions that 
have defence implications”. In June 1992, the WEU Council of ministers defined the so-
called Petersberg tasks, the type of military tasks that the EU can undertake. The declaration 
stated that WEU troops could be deployed for humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping 
tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking (WEU 1992: 
6).  
But during the mid-1990’s, CFSP came under criticism due to the inability of Europe 
to act in the Balkan wars. The NATO intervention in Bosnia showed the huge difference 
between the military capabilities of the US and Europe. The Balkan War had shown Europe’s 
lack of unity an inability to prevent and end a war in its own backyard. Clearly, CFSP did not 
function satisfactory, so a new treaty was needed to bring the necessary institutional reform 
to make CFSP effective. At the end of the Maastricht negotiations, the Member States had 
mandated an intergovernmental conference to rectify the shortcomings of CFSP. This IGC 
was held in Amsterdam in 1997 and the resulting treaty introduced a number of novelties, 
most notably the introduction of the High Representative for the CFSP (HR) which was 
meant to give the EU a higher profile. It is also worth to mention that the Petersberg tasks 
were explicitly included in the TEU. But perhaps most importantly, defence integration was 
back on the agenda.  
In December 1998, France and the UK held a bilateral summit in St. Malo. 
Afterwards, President Chirac and Prime Minister Blair presented a declaration in which they 
called on the EU to develop “the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by military 
forces”. It suggested the creation of a military force within the EU’s CFSP framework. This 
was the first time since the EDC failure that plans for an autonomous force were presented. In 
their joint statement, Chirac and Blair outlined the frameworks and objectives of what was to 
be the ESDP. The Declaration did, however, acknowledge the importance of NATO. It is also 
important to mention that this European defence cooperation was to be aimed at 
peacekeeping missions, not at defence of territorial integrity and political independence of the 
EU and its Member States. 
During the next European Council in June 1999 that was held in Cologne, the other 
EU countries signed up to the ESDP. Decisions would be taken by unanimity and 
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contribution to the European military force would be voluntary. The following European 
Council in Helsinki in December 1999 the Member States specified a Military Headline Goal, 
specifying what the EU’s military capacity had to be to conduct the full range of missions 
comprised by the Petersberg tasks. With the Helsinki Headline Goal (HLG 2003), it was 
decided that the EU was to be able to deploy a force of 50,000-60,000 persons – with the 
necessary command, control, and intelligence capabilities - , able to deploy within sixty days 
and able to sustain deployment for at least a year and capable of the Petersberg tasks. 
 One year later, at the 2000 European Council in Nice it was decided that the WEU 
would be incorporated in ESDP. In the treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam, the WEU had 
been mentioned as an integral part of the development of the EU and that it was meant to 
develop as the defence branch of the EU, but this reflected that fact that the EU would now 
take on that responsibility by itself (Trybus 2005: 101).  
ESDP became operational in 2003. The EU conducted its first military missions: 
EUFOR Concordia, a peacekeeping mission in Macedonia, and operation Artemis, the first 
autonomous military mission outside the EU in the Democratic Republic of Congo. That 
same year the European Security Strategy was presented by HR Javier Solana and adopted by 
the European Council. It was a reaction to rise of global terrorism linked to religious 
extremism and division over Iraq. The document expressed the need for the EU to be increase 
capabilities, more coherent policies, and more actively pursue strategic objectives and 
represented a common strategic vision that was to function as a conceptual framework for 
CFSP. 
 
3.2 European armaments cooperation 
Looking at the overview that was presented in the first part of this chapter, ESDP evolution 
seems to have been a predominantly intergovernmental affair. But the real integration of the 
European defence dimension has occured in the armaments sector. This can be attributed to 
the ambition of the European Commission to expand its activities into defence research and 
defence industrial policy (Mawdsley 2004b). So whereas armaments policy had earlier been 
regarded as reserved for the Member States due to the importance for their national 
sovereignty, the EU has started developing a defence industrial policy (Hartley 2008: 303). 
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3.2.1 Special character of defence industry 
The defence industry is different from other industries, due to its special relationship with the 
nation state. Governments are the primary customers for the firms and states need these firms 
to produce the weapons that provide nations the capability to act militarily. Without the 
means to defend its territorial integrity, a state cannot be sovereign. So, having a national 
defence industry is an ‘existential condition’ for a nation state to survive. Defence industrial 
policy thus touches the core of the concept of sovereignty of the nation state. Maintaining 
national autonomy has always been of great importance to states. For this reason, the defence 
sector was strictly separated from other international trade and had been kept out of the EC.
8
 
 Besides its military character, there are more aspects to the European defence industry 
that make it special. European defence industrial cooperation has been both a military and an 
economic matter, but has always belonged more to the military than the economic sphere of 
European cooperation. Moreover, the defence industry has a civilian side as well. Producers 
of military equipment use civil technologies and many also produce for the civil market. 
Traditionally, the military sphere has created technology that has had a spin-off effect to the 
civilian sphere. The military technologies developed during the 50’s and 60’s spilled over to 
the civilian industries, like aerospace and electronics. For many European defence producers, 
civilian production represents a large share of their business. 
 
3.2.2 European armaments cooperation during the Cold War 
In the period of the Cold War, European armaments cooperation went through three different 
phases. During first phase that lasted from 1945 to 1965, Europe received considerable 
military assistance from America. Directly after WWII, only The UK was able to rearm to the 
levels necessary with the onset of the Cold War. The French defence industry had not made 
much technological progress during the war and armaments production was no longer 
allowed in Germany. Therefore, the US offered military protection through NATO and 
through the Marshall Plan it provided military aid by donating equipment, financing defence 
expenditure and ordering defence equipment produced by European defence industry. In 
1954, NATO set up the Defence production Committee to limit the number of national 
armaments projects and promote co-production between European countries or in 
transatlantic collaborations in order to stimulate standardisation of equipment and reduce the 
number of different equipments within the alliance.  
                                                          
8
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During the second phase from 1965 to 1985, European cooperation in the field om 
armaments emerged. Collaboration was often driven by cost efficiency, because the 
development and production of large-scale weapons projects could only be afforded by 
superpowers. The collaborations in the 1960’s and 1970’s were alliances of national 
producers. The high costs as well as the risks of the production of very expensive projects 
were shared and at least two governments were bound to purchase the pieces of military 
equipment. However, most military equipment would still be developed and produced 
nationally. After the first half of the 1970’s, the three main defence industries – The UK, 
France, and Germany – were all back up their feet. In 1976, all European NATO countries, 
except for Iceland, established the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG), a forum 
for armaments cooperation. The IEPG, however, did not manage to achieve many concrete 
results for European armaments cooperation (Mawdsley 2003: 19). 
 The third phase, that took place the second half of the ‘80’s, brought some big 
developments in European economic cooperation. Most notably the SEA was signed to 
achieve deeper economic integration of the EC economies. With an intensifying Cold War at 
the end of the 1970’s and the early 1980’s, defence procurement budgets had risen, but as 
public expenditure had to be reduced, defence budgets were tightened. The UK and France, 
the two leading weapons producers in Europe, changed their defence procurement system. 
The UK privatised all major British defence contractors. France kept most manufacturers 
state-owned, but created more distance between government and the defence industry. With 
improving East-West relations, home and export markets declined and the defence industry 
showed a trend of national concentration (mergers and acquisitions within national 
boundaries), but also some transnational defence acquisition, which marked the start of the 
formation of joint European companies.  
 
3.2.3 European armaments cooperation after the Cold War 
In the early 1990’s, European defence industry remained nationally oriented. Even if there 
was an urge to merge, this was often hindered by politics because of fear of losing 
sovereignty or loss of jobs due to restructurings after a merger. Executives also feared losing 
the comfortable cultivated relationship with their home defence ministry. The status quo was 
the safest options for both government and business (Guay & Callum 2002:758) 
During the IGC in Maastricht in December 1991, the WEU Ministers of Defence had 
called for further examination of the possibilities for enhanced cooperation in the field of 
 34 
S1282212 
armaments, with the aim of creating a European Armaments Agency. One year later, the 
Defence Ministers of the 13 IEPG countries met in Bonn and decided to the transfer the 
functions of the IEPG to the WEU. The WEU had an armaments cooperation group which 
would later be named the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG). However, the 
WEAG, like the IEPG, wasn’t able to find consensus and proved unable to make any 
significant achievements. Therefore, the four largest arms producing countries (France, 
Germany, Italy and the UK) decided to continue outside of the WEU framework and founded 
OCCAR, their own organisation for joint armament cooperation in November of 1996 to 
cooperate in the field of armaments. 
 With the end of the Cold War, both the domestic and international settings had 
changed markedly. There was less money available for defence procurement, as it was 
expected that security could be achieved with lower levels of armaments. Defence budgets 
decreases drastically. The UK and France had the largest defence industries and the downturn 
deeply affected their industry. The defence sector suffered from the fact that Europe was 
technologically weak. The UK and France were prepared to dedicate ample resources to 
defence R&D, not the least to safe its companies from failing (Walker & Gumment 1993: 6). 
There was a wide belief that the European defence industry needed to be down-sized and 
restructured, and that domestic markets had to be liberalised. 
  In the late 1990’s, the situation in European defence industry proved unsustainable. 
The sector came under economic pressure to consolidate to remain competitive with US and 
there was also political pressure due to rise of ESDP. The European defence industry had to 
become more efficient. Europe's defence industry transformed drastically from a number of 
medium-sized companies with a very national orientation into a situation where three huge 
transnational defence companies run the show. The two largest, BAE Systems and EADS 
were formed in 1999. BAE systems was basically the consolidation of the UK’s defence 
industry into one company. EADS emerged from transnational mergers. The third largest 
European defence company would be formed in 2000, when the privatised French 
Thompson-CSF, that had incorporated the space and defence electronics division of Alcatel 
and the satellite branch of Aérospatiale, bought Racal Electronics of the UK. This new 
combination was named Thales. 
When the EU launched its 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal (HLG 2003) for a Rapid 
Reaction Force, the European countries recognised there was a great shortfall between the 
aspirations and the current capability. A common weapons acquisition programme had to be 
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launched to address these shortages in capabilities (Mawdsley 2002). So, the establishment of 
ESDP and HLG 2003 had a pivotal industrial dimension (Guay & Callum 2002). 
In July of 2000, the Defence Ministers of France, Germany, the UK, Spain, Sweden 
and Italy - who represented 90% of the EU's defence industrial capacity - signed the 
Framework Agreement (FA). This treaty provided the structure for the implementing the 
Letter of Intent (LoI) on measures to facilitate the restructuring of the European defence 
industry, which the six key arms producing countries had signed in July 1998. It aimed to 
create the political and legal framework necessary - harmonization and simplification of rules 
for armaments industry - to facilitate the restructuring of the defence industrial base. This 
restructuring was deemed necessary in order to promote a more competitive and robust 
European Defence Technological and Industrial Base in the global defence market and to 
provide for the technological base for the capabilities Europe needs to be autonomous. 
In July of 2004, European Defence Agency (EDA) was established. The EDA is the 
successor to the WEAG and was created by EU foreign ministers to improve military 
capabilities and support security and defence policies as highlighted in ESS. It aims to do so 
by promoting research and technology, coordinating EU-wide purchasing and contracting of 
weapon systems and the creation of a European arms market. France and The UK played a 
vital role in its creation (Guay 2005: 148), as did lobbying of the industry (EDA 2015). The 
defence industrial lobby had managed to create a simple but compelling relationship between 
the need for forces capable of ‘robust intervention’ and the technological and industrial 
benefits of defence and aerospace research leading to the creation of the EDA (Manners 
2007: 25). 
So, parallel to the development of ESDP, the EU worked on the establishment of a 
European defence industrial base and a European defence market. The EDA was created for 
this purpose. The EU intends to be able to have both the military might associated with a 
global power and the capacity to produce it within its own borders. As mentioned above, this 
link between using and producing one’s own defence equipment is traditionally at the base of 
the affirmation a the sovereign state. It implies the same ‘existential condition’ in which the 
state needs a defence industry in order to survive. So, perhaps, by imitating this, the EU is 
moving towards its own affirmation as a polity that bases its legitimacy on the ownership of 
sovereign tools of power. (Barrinha 2010: 468). 
In December 2007, the European Commission submitted the ‘Defence Package’ with 
the aim to improve the functioning of the fragmented internal market for defence and security 
products and strengthening the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (DTIB) 
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as an essential basis for ESDP. It consisted of a Communication that stressed the need for 
regulation of the arms industry by the EU (European Commission 2007a), and legislative 
proposals for two Directives: one on transfers of defence-related products within the EU 
(European parliament and Council of the EU 2009a), the other on Defence and Security 
Procurement (European parliament and Council of the EU 2009a). After passing through the 
legislative process, the directives were approved in 2009 and are to be implemented by 
national law.  
The Defence Package intends to put an end to the fragmentation of the European 
defence market. Directive 2009/43/EC simplifies the terms and conditions of transfers of 
defence-related products within the Community and eliminates unnecessary formalities 
during the process of shipping defence-related products between Member States. In addition, 
in procedures relating to the awarding of contracts, unsuccessful bidders will have the 
possibility to have legality of the procurement procedure verified by an independent body. 
Before, Member States generally referred to the exemption clauses in the Treaty
9
, to avoid 
procurement law rules. Directive 2009/81/EC aims to counteract this. 
 
3.3 Conclusion 
After the failure of the supranational defence community, European defence integration 
remained taboo for a long time. During the Cold War, Western-European security rested on 
American assistance. Foreign policy coordination slowly developed and took shape in the 
form of CFSP after the end of the Cold War had changed the international political landscape. 
This however could not save the EU from failing to act adequately during the Balkan Wars. 
This led the UK and France to initiate the development of the European defence dimension 
and the acquisition of military capabilities at EU level. European military-political 
cooperation had thus suddenly emerged at the end of the 1990’s, but has remained very much 
intergovernmental in character due to the fact that Members States are not keen on giving up 
sovereignty in this area that touches the core of the nation state.  
 European armaments cooperation has developed parallel to the military-political 
cooperation and followed a similar path. Two decades after WWII, American assistance was 
pivotal. Later, armaments cooperation emerged. When the Cold War ended, defence budgets 
dropped and competition from US firms was fierce. This led to transnational mergers and 
acquisition that created a handful of European defence giants. Armaments policies were very 
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much nationally oriented due to the special character of the defence industry as ‘existential 
condition’ for a sovereign state. It was kept out of the EC, but was included with the rise of 
ESDP because the development of military capabilities had a defence industrial dimension. 
This enabled the European Commission to gain competence in the European defence 
dimension. 
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4. The Case: Lobbying for research funds 
 
This chapter presents the case of the lobbying activities of the defence industry aimed at the 
European Commission during the period following the establishment of ESDP in 1999 and 
leading up to agreement on the 7
th
 Framework Programme for Research and Innovation 
funding for the period 2007-2013 (FP7) in 2006. There are a number of reasons for choosing 
this particular case. First, defence industrial policy is a relevant area of the European defence 
dimension as it is tied to the ESDP objectives. As such, research in de area of European 
defence industry should be viewed as a de facto part of ESDP (Oikonomou 2006: 8). Second, 
the European Commission is supranational institution and driving force behind European 
integration, and is known to be a channel of influence that is very much open to interest 
groups and in particular to those of corporations. So, third, the European defence industry, 
which is known to have strong national lobbies and be a proponent of integration, can be 
expected to actively lobby supranational institutions. Fourth, due to the opaque nature of 
lobbying, interest group activity is often not easy to measure. This case stands out as it is 
relatively well to assess the degree and success of the lobbying efforts. 
 
4.1 The defence industrial lobby 
Simultaneously to the acceleration of developments in the field ESDP and European defence 
industrial policy in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s, an influential defence industrial lobby 
has emerged at EU level. This lobby has had a substantial share in setting the agenda of 
defence industrial policy-making in Europe (Mawdsley 2003; Manners 2007). It is even 
suggested that European military industry lobbying has been playing an important role in the 
emergence of European defence (Gentilucci 2014). 
At EU-level, the European defence industry is represented by the AeroSpace and 
Defence Industries Association of Europe (ADS). ADS was formed in 2004 with the merger 
of the Association Europeene des Constructeurs de Materiel Aerospatial
10
 (AECMA), the 
European Defence Industries Group (EDIG) and EUROSPACE, the organisation of the space 
industry. AECMA has a history that goes back to 1950, EUROSPACE was established in 
1961 and EDIG was founded in 1976 as a body response to the IEPG. In 1984, EDIG had 
been formally recognized by the IEPG as the designated forum to advise the IEPG on 
industrial matters. EDIG and AECMA had opened their offices in Brussels in 1990 and 1991. 
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ADS’ mission is to “to shape EU legislation and policies as well as securing funding 
opportunities by advocating common positions towards European Institutions and 
International organisations”. This covers the areas of defence, security, civil aviation and 
space.  
 
4.2 European Commission’s role in the defence dimension of the EU 
Until the creation of ESDP, the influence of the EU in the national defence policies of the MS 
had been minimal. Even the establishment of CFSP did not make much of a difference, 
because it remained strictly intergovernmental. The Commission had been trying to gain 
competence in field of armaments production for decades, but was unsuccessful because 
Article 223 of the Treaty of Rome (later Art. 296 TEC and now Art. 346 TFEU) exempted 
defence products from the Single Market (except for dual-use goods
11
) and thus from 
regulation by the EU’s institutions (Mawdsley 2002: 4). 
Despite the exemption of article 296 TEC, the Commission did have some influence 
in field of armaments policy, most notably through support of R&D programmes for dual-use 
projects. Besides that, large corporate mergers also have to receive approval from the 
Commission even if there is a defence dimension. Moreover, the Commission can provide 
“funds to alleviate unemployment in area’s affected by closing defence bases or failing 
firms.” (Mawdsley 2003: 21). Lastly, the Commission achieved “to set up a license free 
regime for the trade of dual-use goods in 1995”. Nevertheless, the Commission’s role had 
really still been minimal (Taylor 1997: 132). By the mid-1990, the Commission felt there 
should be a more explicit European defence industrial policy. It published three extensive 
documents (European Commission 1996; 1997a; 1997b) to communicate its position. The 
Commission was actively seeking to strengthen its role in armaments cooperation by saying 
that defence industrial policy was to be part of the Single Market and that armaments 
cooperation had to be an essential part of ESDP (Mawdsley 2002: 9; Guay & Callum 2002: 
767). The initial rapid development of ESDP encouraged the Commission to resume its 
efforts to gain competence in defence industrial policy (Mawdsley 2003: 21-23). 
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4.3 European Commission and Industry cooperation: 
The Commission specifically sought to gain competence in defence industrial policy by 
creating a common European defence industrial market and by providing funding for research 
programmes to support the European defence industrial base. The Commission has been 
regarded to be very open to the industry’s agenda on this matter (Mawdsley 2003: 22). At the 
beginning of a policy making process, the Commission often sets up groups to give advice on 
an initiative or legislation. These groups provide knowledge and expertise that the 
Commission lacks. In general, corporate interests are highly represented in such groups. Two 
notable examples are the European Advisory Group on Aerospace and the Group of 
Personalities for Security Research. 
In 2001, the Commission set up the European Advisory Group on Aerospace. The 
group consisted of 5 commissioners, HR Solana, 2 MEPs and 7 CEO’s of the largest 
European Aerospace firms (including EADS, BAE, Thales and Finmeccanica). In 2002, the 
group published the Strategic Aerospace Review for the 21st century or ‘STAR 21’ report. 
This document contained recommendations for the EU’s institutions, Member States, and 
firms and “echoed statements previously made by the European defence industrial lobby 
groups” (Mawdsley 2003: 21-23). Industry lobby group AECMA and the Commission issued 
a joint press release. 
 In its report, the European Advisory Group on Aerospace argues that EU’s key 
objectives for the ESDP could only be met if the economic and industrial structures in Europe 
are capable of responding to the new requirements. It stresses the aviation sector’s role as a 
key European industry which is of pivotal importance necessary for EU’s presence and 
influence on global stage. It also points to competition from the US, where firms benefit from 
a large home market. The European competition position was in danger due to a fragmented 
market that requires a European framework. The report also stressed the shared technological 
base of military and civil branches of the aviation industry. The group sees fully coordinated 
investments in R&D and efficient procurement as key to delivering the necessary capabilities, 
so it calls for funds for defence research and a coordinated European armaments policy. 
By the end of 2003, it had become clear that European defence firms - EADS, Thales 
and BAE Systems in particular, but other firms as well - had a substantial influence in setting 
the agenda of defence industrial policy in the EU. Unlike other lobby groups in the industry, 
they had very good access on both national and European decision-making structures. They 
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were largely unopposed and this gave the capability to effectively impact policy (Mawdsley 
2003: 14).  
But besides lobbying the backchannels of Europe’s political decision makers, the 
defence industry’s giant also tried to influence and turn up the pressure by issuing public 
communications. In April of 2003, the CEOs of BAE, Thales and EADS issued a joint 
statement calling for action: more cooperation, but especially more funding for defence 
research (Turner et al. 2003). On June 15, just after the EU Foreign Ministers approved the 
EDA at the European Council of Thessaloniki, these CEOs again issued a public declaration. 
This time they published a letter in a full-page advertisement in Le Figaro and the 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, as well as abstracts of the letter the Financial Times and The 
Independent (Ranque. et al. (2004). They urged the Member States to truly commit to the 
EDA and acquire arms together, as well as a again asking for funds for research and calling 
for a common market for defence equipment.  
That same year, the Commission also spoke out through two reports on the 
restructuring of the defence equipment market. One of them was a direct reaction and call for 
action to the fulfil the recommendations of the STAR 21-report. The Commission advocated 
a move towards a common European defence equipment market and a more coherent 
European advanced security research effort. Not surprisingly, the Commission claimed that it 
should play a role in both, besides the roles of the Member States and the industry. The 
Commission directly ties its plans to the ESDP goals: “Strengthening the industrial base and 
market situation of European defence companies will greatly improve the EU’s ability to 
fulfil the Petersberg tasks in the accomplishment of ESDP” (European Commission 2003: 3). 
It mentions the developments in ESDP, but also multilateral developments outside EU 
framework: LoI, OCCAR and WEAG. The Commission also suggests the establishment of a 
European agency to oversee the joint procurement and research programmes. 
 In 2003, the Commission had also set up the Group of Personalities for Security 
Research (GoP) to “propose principles and priorities of a European Security Research 
Programme in line with the EU’s foreign, security and defence policy objectives”. The GoP 
was thus to do recommendations for a future European Security Research Programme 
(ESRP). This ESRP was to be included within the upcoming 7th Framework Programme for 
EU research for 2007-2013. The GoP was co-chaired by the Commissioner for Research and 
Commissioner for Enterprise and the Information Society and further composed of eight 
industry chairmen of arms producing companies, four MEP’s, four heads of major research 
institutes, two high-level European Defence Ministry officials and former Prime Minister of 
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Sweden Carl Bildt and former President of Finland Martti Ahtisaari. According to Jan 
Dekker, the then head of research institute TNO and member of the GoP, and Pieter de Smet, 
Commission official at DG Research, the Commission was looking to fill the GoP with 
likeminded people and therefor invited the defence industrial lobby to nominate members for 
the group. The MEP’s were only invited to create a support base in the EP (Persson 2004). In 
February of 2004, the Commission launched a ‘Preparatory Action’ on security research to 
prepare the basis for a fully developed European Security Research programme starting in 
2007 (European Commission 2004a). It was a proposal for projects and support for €65 
million that would function as a pilot for the ESRP.  
Shortly after, in March 2004, the Group of Personalities presented its report with 
recommendations. Similar to the STAR21 report, it contended there should be no difference 
between civilian security and military security research. Furthermore, it suggested that 1 
billion euros per year should be spent on security research in the ESRP. In September, the 
Commission presented the communication ‘Security research: The next Steps’ (European 
Commission 2004b) in which it endorsed the recommendations of the GoP’s report. It is 
interesting to note the change of language: the term ‘security’ instead of ‘defence’. This was 
done deliberately, because security encompasses threats both defence and homeland security. 
But, it’s not only done to include protection against internal threats, as Jan Dekker, had 
revealed in an interview with De Volkskrant (Persson 2004). The military term was avoided 
on purpose. The term ‘security’ is used to disguise the defence nature.  
 In April 2005, the European Security Research Advisory Board (ESRAB) was 
established by the Commission to advise on the content of the ESRP and its implementation, 
with special attention to the GoP proposals (European Commission 2005). The board was 
composed of 50 high-level specialists and strategists in the field of security research 
including 14 representatives of the defence industry (including EADS, Thales, BAE Systems, 
Finmeccanica and three others who were in the GoP). Also, there were 18 seats for the 
Member States, 14 seats for academics and institutes, 2 seats for civil society organisations 
and the EU was represented by Europol and the EDA. In addition, five Members of the 
European Parliament and representatives from 14 European Commission services 
participated in the workings of the board. EADS and Thales each chaired the board for one 
year. In 2006 the board issued its final report (European Security Research Advisory Board 
2006), setting research priorities for FP7. 
 When the Member States reached agreement on FP7, there was a total budget of €51 
billion of which €1.4 billion was reserved for ‘Space’ and 1.4 billion for ‘Security’ (European 
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parliament and Council of the EU 2006). Defence, however, was not a topic. Originally, 
ESRP had the intention to include specific defence research, but due to concerns over 
sovereignty issues this was broadened to security (Oikonomu 2006: 3-6). Former ESRAB 
chairman and senior vice-president of Thales Tim Robinson has commented that there was a 
move towards the use of the term ‘security’ as it is more politically acceptable than using the 
term ‘defence’. Additionally, the industry had already stressed in their previous reports that 
there really was no distinction between civilian and military anymore, as their technological 
basis is the same. Most large arms producing companies are active in both the defence and 
homeland security market. The leading defence firms – BAE Systems, Thales, EADS and 
Finmeccanica – are some of the companies who benefit most from the funds grated from the 
security and space research funds of RP7 (Hayes 2009: 18-19).  
 
4.4 Conclusion 
Simultaneously to the acceleration of developments in the field ESDP and European defence 
industrial policy in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s, an influential defence industrial lobby 
has emerged at EU level. This lobby has had a substantial share in setting the agenda of 
defence industrial policy-making in Europe. Until the creation of ESDP, the role of the EU in 
the national defence policies of the MS had been minimal because Article 223 of the Treaty 
of Rome exempted defence products from the Single Market and thus from regulation by the 
EU’s institutions (Mawdsley 2002: 4). The Commission had been trying to gain competence 
in field of armaments production for decades, but was unsuccessful. The initial rapid 
development of ESDP encouraged the Commission to resume its efforts to gain competence 
in defence industrial policy by ‘teaming up’ with the defence industry. The defence industrial 
lobby used the preparatory groups formed by the European Commission to exert influence on 
the defence industrial policy and promote its agenda. The capability needs for ESDP where 
used to secure financial support in the form of research funds, which were disguised as 
‘security’ to hide the defence nature. 
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5. Analysis 
 
This chapter puts forward an analysis of the case that has been presented in the previous 
chapter. This analysis assesses whether the activities of the defence industrial lobby support 
the argument of a supranationalisation of the European defence dimension. First, the interest 
group activity of the defence industry will be analysed to see if fits the patterns of neo-
functionalist integration theory. Second, the case will be examined from an 
intergovernmentalist perspective. Third and last, both evaluations will be discussed and 
conclusions are drawn.  
 
5.1 Summary of the case 
There are many definitions that describe the lobbying behaviour of interest groups. So, in 
order to assess the interest group activity of the defence industrial lobby, it is required to 
define what exactly is meant with lobbying. This analysis uses an extended version of the 
definition of the European Commission, which defines lobbying, or interest representation, as 
“activities carried out with the objective of influencing the policy formulation and decision-
making processes of the European institutions” (European Commission 2007b: 3). This 
definition is defined too narrow, as it does not explicitly include the influencing of policy 
implementation, which is specifically relevant in this case. The definition of lobbying shall 
thus encompass all activities carried out with the objective of influencing the policy 
formulation and decision-making processes of the European institutions, as well as the 
implementation and execution of policies and decisions of the institutions of the EU.  
In the case presented in last chapter, the defence industry successfully lobbied the EU 
for research funds through one of its institutions. The defence industry was able to lobby with 
this degree of success thanks to an institution that was highly receptive for the industry’s 
lobbying activities. In fact, the Commission actively pursued the same goals as the 
armaments lobby. The two cooperated and functioned as a tandem because both parties 
needed each other to attain their own objectives. The Commission was looking to gain 
competence in the field of defence industrial policy and the defence industry was seeking 
funding. With the reports that were presented by the preparatory groups, they expressed and 
created a need for regulation and funding to reach the level of weapons capabilities needed to 
support the Headline Goals of ESDP. That way, they effectively lobbied the European 
Council and European Parliament to approve the budget for the research funds. 
 45 
S1282212 
5.2 Neo-functionalist patterns 
Neo-functionalism emphasises the power of institutions and regards integration as a process 
characterised by spillover dynamics, political agency of self-interested groups, loyalty 
transfer of such groups to supranational high authorities, and ‘cultivated spillover’ by these 
higher authorities. These patterns will be used as indicators to examine whether the defence 
industrial lobbying of the Commission follows a neo-functionalist path. 
 
5.2.1 Political agency 
The engagement of actors with the integration process is an indispensable part of the neo-
functionalist theory. Among these purposeful actors in pursuit of their own self-interest are 
powerful corporate interest groups who aim to influence the policy formulation and decision-
making processes. As the Europeanisation of polity advances, Europe-wide interest 
associations are established in a process of ‘supranationalisation’ of the organizational form 
of these interest groups. The course of integration would be visible in the changed behaviour 
of these groups. In particular, integrative processes would be clearly noticeable in strategies 
of interest groups seeking to influence policy outcomes. If these groups perceive that political 
power shifts towards supranational institutions, they will adapt their strategies in a process of 
‘loyalty transference’ and start focussing their activities on supranational institutions. 
Especially when these groups have direct access to the new region-level institutions. These 
groups of interest-driven actors will cultivate functional linkages and create political 
pressures for deeper integration to achieve their goals. Business associations are a strong 
lobby for further integration as they anticipate a certain economic environment.  
 The European defence industry’s interest representation has undergone a process of 
supranationalisation when AECMA, EDIG and EUROPSPACE were founded. The three 
were later merged into the ADS, who’s mission it is to shape EU legislation and policies as 
well as securing funding opportunities. It is evident that this interest group is a purposeful 
actors in pursuit of its own self-interest and aims to influence the policy formulation and 
decision-making processes. ADS was often represented by individual members which 
functioned as members of the expert groups. The fact that they work together as one can be 
seen from the fact that a joint press release was issued by the Commission and AECMA for 
the presentation of the STAR 21 report, while the AECMA was formally not part of the 
group but represented by 7 European Aerospace firms. Besides industrywide cooperation, the 
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CEOs of BAE, Thales and EADS have shown also to cooperate multilaterally in a smaller 
formation when issuing public declarations. 
 The EU’s institutions are very much dependent on outside interests for its policy 
making. Due to its relatively small size and the technical nature of many issues, the European 
Commission actively seeks interest groups to participate in the policymaking process 
(Greenwood 2011: 3-5, 33-43). From the early 2000’s, the defence industry has shown to 
have direct access to the European Commission and the early stages of the legislative 
process. Their presence in the European Advisory Group on Aerospace, Group of 
Personalities for Security Research, and the European Security Research Advisory Board are 
proof of this. The defence industry used these groups to articulate their wishes and has been 
quite successful. They created political pressure through reports of the expert groups by 
linking ESDP goals to funding for security research and amplified this pressure through 
public statements in newspapers. The cooperation in the Commission’s expert group clearly 
indicates a process of loyalty transference to the supranational institution. 
 
5.2.2 Spillover dynamics 
The concept of ‘spillover’ is central to neo-functionalism. There are different forms of 
spillover, most importantly economic spillover, political spillover, and cultivated spillover. 
Economic spillover is the notion that integration will inevitably lead to more integration, 
because wider integration is needed to make existing policies function properly. Full 
integration of a sector cannot be accomplished without integration in connected sectors of the 
economy. Political spillover occurs when economic integration creates a need for further 
supranational institutionalization. Deeper and wider integration requires supranational 
regulatory capacity, so political spillover appears as a consequence of economic integration. 
Political spillover requires a process of loyalty transference to be accomplished. Cultivated 
spillover is the promotion of integration by supranational institutions. It is political activism 
by a higher authority to progress the economic spillover. 
 Functional linkages can be observed in the integration of European defence. The 
economies of the Member States combined form a large trade block in the global economy. 
To safeguard its interests, the EU requires an effective external affairs policy. This cannot be 
without a credible foreign policy. In order to have a credible foreign policy (CFSP), the EU 
must have a credible defence policy (ESDP). This link was substantiated by the 2009 Lisbon 
Treaty, when the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and 
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External Relations Commissioner were merged into the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Also heads the EDA was Secretary-General of the 
WEU. More specifically, to make ESDP work certain capabilities are required. These HLGs 
require a strong defence industrial base. Therefore, the defence sector, which had been 
strictly separated from other international trade and had been kept out of the EC, has now 
been subjected to the EU. Also, due to the blurring of the boundary between 
civilian/homeland security and defence, the EU has managed to gain more regulatory powers 
in the defence industry. The inclusion of a supranational actor, the Commission, and the 
loyalty transference of interest groups also points to some form of political spillover. 
 The inclusion of the European Commission in defence industrial policy is very much 
the product of its own agency. The Commission had been trying to gain competence in field 
of armaments production for decades, but was unsuccessful due to the exclusion clause in the 
treaties that exempted defence products from the Single Market. The development of ESDP 
encouraged the Commission to resume its efforts to gain competence in defence industrial 
policy. The Commission advocated a move towards a common European defence equipment 
market and a more coherent European advanced security research effort. Not surprisingly, the 
Commission claimed that it should play a role in both. The Commission directly ties its plans 
to the ESDP goals. The Commission’s activism was clearly visible when it gave industry a 
leading role in its preparatory groups invited the defence industrial lobby to nominate 
members as it was looking to fill the them with likeminded people, as was confirmed by 
insiders. This behaviour is evidently a form of cultivated spillover. 
 
5.2 Comments from an intergovernmentalist perspective 
To qualify the case presented earlier as evidence of a supranationalisation of the European 
defence dimension, it is not sufficient to demonstrate that it fits the patterns of neo-
functionalist integration theory. It must also withstand intergovernmentalist critique. First and 
foremost, the intergovernmentalist counterargument would be that the neo-functionalist 
patterns indeed exist, but that they only occur in areas of low politics. Hoffmann argued that 
there cannot be spillover into high politics, because the spillover dynamics end when issues 
go beyond the purely economic problems of little impact and reach areas of controversy 
which involve fundamental interests of the Member States. In other words, although there 
might have been a significant increase in defence cooperation among EU Member States 
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since the end of the Cold War, the major defence decisions are still made in the capitals of the 
Member States and in the European Council. 
 The ability to produce the arms that provide a nation the capability to act militarily, 
defend its territorial integrity and be sovereign is of vital national interest, hence the 
exception of defence industrial policy from Single Market. The fact that neo-functionalist 
patterns of integration are now present in the area of defence industrial policy means that 
either the label ‘high politics’ is no longer applicable to defence industrial policy because the 
perception of the policy area has altered, or Hoffmann’s definition of the distinction between 
high politics and low politics is no longer valid because the notion has changed, or a 
combination of both. 
 If Hoffmann’s definition of the distinction between high politics and low politics 
would still be valid, the intergovernmentalist argument could be that defence industrial policy 
is just no longer an area of high politics. If that were true, the ability to produce weapons 
would have to be no longer vital for the survival of the Member States and this would make it 
acceptable for them to have the defence industrial policy regulated at EU level. As discussed 
earlier, he EU intends to be able to have both the military might associated with a global 
power and the capacity to produce it within its own borders and possibly moving towards its 
own affirmation as a polity that bases its legitimacy on the ownership of sovereign tools of 
power (Barrinha 2010: 468).  
For some Member States this might indeed be the case. As members of a military 
alliance and politico-economic union, NATO and the EU, which both have a mutual defence 
clause, many Member States were already not producing the larger share of their defence 
capabilities but buying from their allies. However, this certainly not concerns all of the 
Member States. Moreover, dependency on other states for the acquisition of armaments 
would certainly not be an option for several Member States. These sovereignty issues were 
the reason that the term ‘security’ was instead of ‘defence’, as it is more politically 
acceptable. Therefore, this argument cannot hold. 
So, perhaps Hoffmann’s definitions of the distinction between which policy areas do 
and which are not open to neo-functionalist dynamics is not well formulated. A definition 
should include all that should be included, and exclude what should excluded. Hoffmann’s 
definition of the distinction between high politics and low politics as matters that go beyond 
the purely economic problems of little impact and reach areas of controversy which involve 
fundamental interests of the Member States is not accurate. After all, besides its economic 
and civilian characteristics, the defence industry has a distinct military character and it 
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involves the fundamental interests of the Member States. This would imply that defence 
industry is in fact an area of high politics and that spillover would not reach it. However, 
spillover dynamics are present. Therefore, the definition of the distinction would have to be 
adjusted.  
Hoffmann formulated a rather clear description of the division, but what he really 
meant was to define the difference between the political decisions that truly matter and those 
that are less important. This formulation is rather broad, vague and arbitrary, but does enable 
us to explain from an intergovernmentalist perspective why the neo-functionalist patterns are 
present in the area of defence industrial policy. The neo-functionalist dynamics occur because 
the real important political decisions were already taken intergovernmentally with the 
establishment of ESDP. Decision-making in the field of defence industrial policy is just not 
as important anymore, as it logically follows logically from those earlier crucial decisions. 
 
5.3 Conclusions 
This thesis set out to explain how interest group activity indicates a supranationalisation of 
the European defence dimension. Several scholars have argued that the European defence 
dimension is moving away from intergovernmentalism and towards supranationalism. If the 
EU’s defence dimension is moving towards supranationalism, decision-making in the field of 
security and defence should be moving towards supranational institutions. This should be 
visible in the channels of influence that interest groups choose to lobby, as these groups will 
shift their focus towards supranational institutions. Accordingly, the primary research 
question of this thesis was: do the lobbying activities of the defence industry suggest a 
supranationalisation of the European defence dimension? In other words, does the interest 
group activity of armaments producing companies fit the patterns of neo-functionalist 
integration theory? 
The defence industry successfully lobbied the EU for research funds through one of 
its institutions. The defence industry was able to lobby with this degree of success thanks to 
an institution that was highly receptive for the industry’s lobbying activities. In fact, the 
Commission actively pursued the same goals as the armaments lobby. The two cooperated 
and functioned as a tandem because both parties needed each other to attain their own 
objectives. Studying the case shows that neo-functionalist patterns are indeed present in the 
defence dimension of the EU. There is clear political agency from the defence industrial 
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lobby that interacts with the cultivated spillover dynamics caused by agency of the European 
Commission. Besides that, forms of both economic and political spillover are present as well.  
 Neo-functionalist patterns have clearly occurred, however, To qualify the case 
presented earlier as evidence of a supranationalisation of the European defence dimension, It 
must also withstand intergovernmentalist critique. The intergovernmentalist counterargument 
would be that the neo-functionalist patterns indeed exist, but that they only occur in areas of 
low politics. By following the intergovernmentalist reasoning, it becomes clear that these 
neo-functionalist patterns have occurred after and as a result of intergovernmental political 
decisions. The supranational integration seems only marginal compared to the 
intergovernmental integration, suggesting that the intergovernmentalist view on European 
integration: the truly important decisions are still made by the Member States. As such, this 
case has not indicated that has been a significant supranationalisation of the European 
defence dimension as a whole. Even more so, it suggests that the traditional view that the 
integration of the European defence dimension can best be explained from an 
intergovernmentalist perspective. Nonetheless, supranationalism has made its way into the 
defence dimension of the European Union. Perhaps it marks the beginning of a gradual 
expansion of neo-functionalist patterns in this policy area that traditionally viewed as rigidly 
intergovernmental. 
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Conclusion 
 
The EU has long been seen as a unique actor in world politics. However, developments in the 
area of European security and defence have been significant and this has changed the nature 
of the EU’s power and its character as international actor. The defence industrial lobby has 
played a role in the process of militarization of the EU. The conventional view is that 
European defence integration is an exception to the neo-functionalist integration. Both 
intergovernmentalists and neo-functionalist agree that European defence integration has to be 
explained by intergovernmentalist theory. However, the development of the European 
defence dimension have inspired some to believe that the policy area is moving away from its 
rigidly intergovernmental character to a more supranational path of integration. 
 After the failure of the supranational defence community, European defence 
integration remained taboo for a long time. European military-political cooperation then 
suddenly emerged at the end of the 1990’s, but has remained very much intergovernmental in 
character due to the fact that Members States are not keen on giving up sovereignty in this 
area that touches the core of the nation state. Simultaneously to the acceleration of 
developments in the field ESDP and European defence industrial policy in the late 1990’s and 
early 2000’s, an influential defence industrial lobby has emerged at EU level. This lobby has 
had a substantial share in setting the agenda of defence industrial policy-making in Europe. 
 This thesis set out to explain how interest group activity indicates a 
supranationalisation of the European defence dimension. Several scholars have argued that 
the European defence dimension is moving away from intergovernmentalism and towards 
supranationalism. If the EU’s defence dimension is moving towards supranationalism, 
decision-making in the field of security and defence should be moving towards supranational 
institutions. This should be visible in the channels of influence that interest groups choose to 
lobby, as these groups will shift their focus towards supranational institutions. Accordingly, 
the primary research question of this thesis was: do the lobbying activities of the defence 
industry suggest a supranationalisation of the European defence dimension? In other words, 
does the interest group activity of armaments producing companies fit the patterns of neo-
functionalist integration theory? 
Until the creation of ESDP, the role of the EU in the national defence policies of the 
Member States had been minimal because defence products were exempted from the Single 
Market and thus from regulation by the EU’s institutions. The Commission had been trying to 
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gain competence in field of armaments production for decades, but was unsuccessful. The 
initial rapid development of ESDP encouraged the Commission to resume its efforts to gain 
competence in defence industrial policy by ‘teaming up’ with the defence industry. The 
defence industrial lobby used the preparatory groups formed by the European Commission to 
exert influence on the defence industrial policy and promote its agenda. The capability needs 
required by ESDP and the HLG’s were used to secure financial support in the form of 
research funds, which were disguised as ‘security’ to hide the defence nature. 
 The case of defence industrial lobbying for research funds shows that neo-
functionalist patterns are indeed present in the defence dimension of the EU. There is clear 
political agency from the defence industrial lobby that interacts with the cultivated spillover 
dynamics caused by agency of the European Commission. Besides that, forms of both 
economic and political spillover are present as well. However, by following the 
intergovernmentalist reasoning, it stands clear that these neo-functionalist patterns have 
occurred after and as a result of intergovernmental political decisions. The supranational 
integration seems only marginal compared to the intergovernmental integration, confirming 
the intergovernmentalist view on European integration that the truly important decisions are 
still made by the Member States. Neo-functionalist patterns occurred in the defence 
dimension of the EU, but only in a policy area that has to be regarded as ‘low politics’. As 
such, this case has not indicated that has been a significant supranationalisation of the 
European defence dimension as a whole. Even more so, it suggests that the traditional view 
that the integration of the European defence dimension can best be explained from an 
intergovernmentalist perspective. Nonetheless, supranationalism has made its way into the 
defence dimension of the European Union. Perhaps it marks the beginning of a gradual 
expansion of neo-functionalist patterns in this policy area that traditionally viewed as rigidly 
intergovernmental. 
This thesis applied a strict distinction between the neo-functionalist and 
intergovernmentalist Integration theories. They are presented as opposites contending for the 
truth. However, as was shown in this, both theories are valid. The theories can be applied 
simultaneously, only on different level and during different phases. This relates to what 
Hoffmann saw as the distinction between ‘high politics’ and ‘low politics’. He did not deny 
the existence of neo-functionalist patterns of integration, but noted that these dynamics could 
not reach ‘high politics’. The two theories should thus be used in conjunction and treated as 
two approaches that could complement each other in explaining European integration. 
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This research has suggested that the conventional view that the integration of the 
European defence dimension should be explained from an intergovernmentalist perspective. 
From this stance, it would be interesting to investigate the lobbying activities of the defence 
industry leading up to the ‘truly important’ decision of the establishment of the ESDP. The 
defence industry is known to have encouraged the development a European Defence policy 
and to be a strong force (Hofmann 2012: 50-51). According to Moravcsik’s liberal 
intergovernmentalism, the development of ESDP can be explained by subsequently analysing 
national preference formation and intergovernmental strategic negotiation interaction. The 
foreign policy goals of a state are to be seen as a response to pressures from domestic group 
on the national government. In that case, it could be particularly interesting to investigate 
how the national preference formation of France and The UK, the two biggest arms 
producing countries of the EU, was influenced by possible pressures of their domestic 
armament lobbies on the road to St. Malo. Although somewhat speculative, it is not 
unrealistic to believe that the establishment of ESDP, which lead to the formulation of HLGs 
and specific capability needs, has an obvious industrial dimension, that offers a solution for 
post-Cold War situation of decreasing defence budgets, fragmented armaments market in 
Europe, and competition of US firms to the defence industry of two countries which rely on 
the economic and military capacity of the defence sector (Mawdsley 2004a: 12). With the 
policy entrepreneurship of France and The UK that lead to St. Malo, the two countries set the 
agenda, but later on also kept control of the agenda (Mawdsley 2004a: 9-10). A clear 
example is that France and The UK played a vital role in the creation of the EDA besides 
lobbying of the defence industry. Such research might shed light on the interest group activity 
and influence of defence industry on integration in ‘high political’ areas of the European 
defence dimension. 
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